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Abstract
We study correlated jamming in joint source-channel communication systems. An i.i.d. source is to be communicated over a
memoryless channel in the presence of a correlated jammer with non-causal knowledge of user transmission. This user-jammer
interaction is modeled as a zero sum game. A set of conditions on the source and the channel is provided for the existence of
a Nash equilibrium for this game, where the user strategy is uncoded transmission and the jammer strategy is i.i.d jamming.
This generalizes a well-known example of uncoded communication of a Gaussian sources over Gaussian channels with additive
jamming. Another example, of a Binary Symmetric source over a Binary Symmetric channel with jamming, is provided as a
validation of this result.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we examine the problem of communication in the presence of correlated jamming in Joint Source-Channel
Communication (JSCC) systems. Here, an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) source is to be communicated over
a memoryless channel while a jamming adversary, which can listen to the user communication, attempts to disrupt this
communication. In the absence of jamming, we know that the separation scheme [1], which is the strategy of splitting the
coding into two stages of source coding followed by channel coding, results in optimal performance. The separation scheme
generally needs the use of long codewords thus, causing large delays. However, Gastpar et al. show in [2] that this is not
always necessary, and that there exist certain JSCC systems where the optimal performance guaranteed through the separation
principle can also be obtained through a much simpler zero-delay uncoded communication scheme. Such systems are called
matched source-channel systems in [2].
In one of the earliest works which studies jamming in JSCC systems [3], Bas¸ar considers the problem of communicating a
zero-mean Gaussian random variable over an AWGN channel in the presence of a correlated jamming adversary. The jammer
is average power constrained and allowed to correlate to the encoder’s output i.e. the jammer has access to the encoder’s
input to the channel. The user-jammer interaction is modeled as a game over the average distortion in the source data. A
Nash equilibrium pair of strategies for the user and the jammer is determined and the corresponding equilibrium utility value
obtained. In our work, we extend this formulation to examine the problem of communicating an i.i.d. source vector over a
memoryless channel under jamming.
Apart from [3], various other works too, have considered the problem of jamming in JSCC systems. Bas¸ar and Wu [4]
study the problem of communicating a Gaussian random variable over an AWGN channel when the jammer, instead of being
correlated to the encoder’s output as in [3], is correlated to the encoder’s input. The problem of jamming in additive Gaussian
channels for arbitrary sources is studied in [5], [6].
In this paper, we consider the problem of communicating a fixed length random vector produced by an i.i.d source over a
memoryless channel in the presence of a jammer. The jammer has non-causal knowledge of the user’s encoder output (i.e.,
encoder’s input to the channel) and is allowed to correlate with it. We formulate a non-cooperative zero sum game between
the user and jammer, where the user’s utility is the average source distortion. The user aims to minimize the average distortion
while the jammer aims to maximize it. We determine a set of conditions on the source and the channel such that uncoded
communication and i.i.d. jamming form a Nash equilibrium. Extending the terminology introduced in [2] to describe uncoded
systems which are optimal, we call uncoded JSCC systems with i.i.d. jamming as matched source-jammer-channel systems.
We show that the Gaussian setup considered by Bas¸ar in [3] is an example of a matched source-jammer-channel system. We
also study the problem of communicating a binary symmetric source over the binary symmetric channel in the presence of a
correlated jammer and show it to be another instance of a matched source-jammer-channel system system. We determine its
Nash equilibrium utility.
The following is the organization of the paper. In Section II, we describe the system model and discuss the problem setup
along with the resulting non-cooperative game. Our main result is stated in Section III where we also provide its detailed proof
through the analysis of the non-cooperative game between the user and the jammer. We discuss and analyse two important
examples of JSCC systems with jamming, viz., the Gaussian system and the binary system, in Section IV, the latter not
having been considered before to the best of our knowledge. We devote the next two sections toward the discussion of certain
important implications of our results and some overall concluding remarks.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. The Communication Setup
Consider the communication setup given in Fig. 1. The user intends to transmit data from a Discrete Memoryless Source
Encoder Decoder
Jammer
ChannelSource
Fig. 1. The Problem Setup
(DMS) over a Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) in the presence of a correlated jammer. The user encodes a size-n block
of source data Sn into Xn and transmits it over the channel. The correlated jammer observes this encoded block of data
non-causally and inputs a jamming signal Jn into the channel. Owing to the channel noise and the jammer input, the channel
generates a noisy output Y n of the encoded data. The decoder, upon receiving Y n, generates an estimate Sˆn of the original
source data according to a given fidelity criterion. We now describe the important elements in this problem, viz., the source,
the channel and the code.
The DMS is specified by a pmf pS(s), s ∈ S, where every Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , n is according to pS(.). The receiver estimate
of the source data is (Sˆ1, Sˆ2, . . . , Sˆn), where Sˆi ∈ Sˆ, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Consider an additive distortion criterion and let d
denote the per-letter distortion measure for the source data, where d : S × Sˆ → R+. Here, the average distortion between
source date sn and its estimate sˆn is given as
d(sn, sˆn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(si, sˆi). (1)
The communication channel is a DMC specified by the conditional pmf pY |X,J(y|x, j), where x ∈ X is the encoder’s channel
input, j ∈ J is the channel input of the jammer and y ∈ Y is the channel output respectively. Since the channel is a DMC, if
xn and jn are the encoder’s and the jammer’s channel input respectively and the resulting channel output is yn, then
pY n|Xn,Jn(yn|xn, jn) =
n∏
i=1
pY |X,J(yi|xi, ji).
The sender employs a unit-rate joint source channel code [7] to communicate the source data over the channel. Such a joint
source-channel code, denoted by (f, g), is specified through the encoding function f , where f : Sn → Xn, and a decoding
function g, where g : Yn → Sˆn. Let the cost of transmitting x ∈ X on the channel be ρX(x), where ρX : X → R+. The user
has an average transmit cost constraint of PU and hence, Xn is such that
∑n
i=1 ρX(Xi) ≤ nPU .
The encoder output is observed non-causally by an adversarial jammer and hence, the jammer can correlate its signal with it.
The jammer behaviour is represented through its jamming function λ¯. Thus, upon observing Xn, the jammer chooses its own
channel input Jn = λ¯(Xn), where Jn = (Ji)ni=1 = λ¯(X
n) = (λ1(X
n), λ2(X
n), . . . , λn(X
n)) and Ji ∈ J , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let ρJ|X(j|x) be the jammer cost function, where ρJ|X : J × X → R. The jammer’s signal Jn is average transmit cost
constrained to PJ , and thus,
∑n
i=1 E[E[ρJ|X(Ji, Xi)]] ≤ nPJ . Note here that, in general, the jammer cost function depends
on X .
Given these different elements, let us define a JSCC System with a Jammer (JSCCSJ) as follows.
Definition 1 (JSCCSJ). A JSCC System with a Jammer (JSCCSJ) is defined as a tuple (pS , pY |X,J , ρX , ρJ|X , d), where pS is
the i.i.d. source distribution, pY |X,J is the memoryless channel distribution, ρX is the user cost function, ρJ|X is the jammer
cost function and d is the distortion measure.
Now for this JSCCSJ, upon using the code (f, g) and when the jamming strategy is λ¯, the resulting average distortion in
the original source data Sn, given its estimate Sˆn, is
D(f, λ¯, g) =
1
n
E
[
d(Sn, Sˆn)
]
. (2)
Note that we allow the user strategy as well as the jammer strategy to be either deterministic or probabilistic.
B. The Problem Statement
Given the average cost constraint PU , the user seeks to minimize the average distortion in (2) through the choice of an
appropriate code (f, g) ∈ Cn(PU ). Here, Cn(PU ) is the set of all feasible n-length unit-rate joint source channel codes i.e.
codes where the user average cost constraint PU is satisfied. On the contrary, the jammer seeks to maximize the average
distortion in (2) through the choice of an appropriate jamming strategy λ¯ ∈ Ln(PJ). Here, Ln(PJ) is the set of all feasible
n-length jammer strategies i.e. jammer strategies which satisfy the jammer cost constraint PJ .
Given the opposing interests of the user and the jammer over the average distortion, we formulate and analyse a non-
cooperative zero sum game between the user and the jammer. Referring to the underlying system, we call this game the
JSCCSJ (pS , pY |X,J , ρX , ρJ|X , d) game. Here, our interest lies in determining a Nash equilibrium pair (f∗, λ¯∗, g∗) of user and
jammer strategies for this game such that
D(f∗, λ¯, g∗) ≤ D(f∗, λ¯∗, g∗) ≤ D(f, λ¯∗, g) (3)
holds over all (f, g) ∈ Cn(PU ) and λ¯ ∈ Ln(PJ). Also, since all Nash equilibria of a zero sum game possess the same utility [8],
the game has a unique Nash equilibrium utility. The system will be characterized in terms of this equilibrium average distortion
D(f∗, λ¯∗, g∗).
III. THE MAIN RESULT
The main result of our work is the determination of a set of conditions on the source and the channel in a JSCCSJ under
which a single-letter coding strategy and i.i.d. jamming strategy form a Nash equilibrium of the game over a JSCCSJ. The
following theorem gives the main result. Here D(·||·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two distributions.
Theorem 2. Let pS and pY |X,J be a source and channel respectively. For a given pX|S , pJ|X and pSˆ|Y , suppose ρX(x),
ρJ|X(j|x) and d(s, sˆ) are of the form
ρX(x)
{
= a1D(pY |X(.|x)||pY (.)) + a2 if pX(x) > 0
≥ a1D(pY |X(.|x)||pY (.)) + a2 else
(4a)
d(s, sˆ) = −b1 log(pS|Sˆ(s|sˆ)) + d0(s) (4b)
ρJ|X(j|x)
{
= c1
∑
s,y,sˆ pS(s)pX|S(x|s)pY |X,J(y|x, j)pSˆ|Y (sˆ|y)d(s, sˆ) + c2 if pJ|X(j|x) > 0
≥ c1
∑
s,y,sˆ pS(s)pX|S(x|s)pY |,X,J(y|x, j)pSˆ|Y (sˆ|y)d(s, sˆ) + c2 else
(4c)
for some constants a1 > 0, b1 > 0, c1 > 0, a2, c2, and some function d0(s). Then, the single-letter communication strategy
(pX|S , pSˆ|Y ) and the i.i.d. jamming strategy pJ|X form a Nash equilibrium for the JSCCSJ (pS , pY |X,J , ρX , ρJ|X , d) game.
Here, pX(x) =
∑
s pS(s)pX|S(x|s).
Such a single-letter coding strategy is commonly referred to as an uncoded communication strategy. Extending the nomencla-
ture in [2], we call a JSCCSJ a matched source-jammer-channel system if uncoded communication strategy and i.i.d. jamming
form a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2: The proof has two parts.
Part A: In this part, we show that when the jamming signal is i.i.d. with a pmf pJ|X , if ρX and d are chosen as in (4), then
the single-letter communication scheme (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ) minimizes the average distortion.
Since the channel pY |X,J is a memoryless channel and the jammer strategy pJ|X is an i.i.d strategy, the resulting channel
between the encoder and the decoder is also a memoryless channel with
pY |X(y|x) =
∑
j∈J
pY |X,J(y|x, j)pJ|X(j|x).
For this channel transition probability, the conditions (4a) and (4b) are the same conditions as in [2, Theorem 6] under which
the uncoded communication strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ) minimizes the average distortion. Thus, the result follows from [2, Theorem
6].
Part B: In this part, we show that when the user employs uncoded communication strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ), and d and ρJ|X are
as in (4b) and (4c), then i.i.d jamming strategy pJ|X maximizes the average distortion.
Let us fix the user strategy to be uncoded communication where the encoder and decoder pmfs are pX|S and pSˆ|Y respectively.
To begin with, for a given distortion measure d, jammer’s cost function ρJ|X , and a fixed uncoded user strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ),
let us define the jammer’s distortion cost function as
DpX|S ,pSˆ|Y (PJ) = maxpJ|X :E[E[ρJ|X(J|X)]]≤PJ
E[d(S, Sˆ)]. (5)
For simplicity of notation, we denote this distortion cost function as D(PJ) without the subscript. Note that the above
maximization is over i.i.d. jamming strategies, and it is not obvious that the jammer can not exceed this distortion by employing
non-i.i.d. jamming. The following theorem establishes this non-trivial result.
Theorem 3. For a given source pS , a channel pY |X,J , an uncoded user strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ), a distortion measure d, and a
jammer cost function ρJ|X ; the maximum average distortion (per source data bit) inflicted by the correlated jammer is D(PJ).
Before proving this result, we state and prove some auxiliary results on D(PJ).
Claim 4. D(PJ) is a non-decreasing function.
Proof: The proof follows in a straightforward manner.
Claim 5. D(PJ) is a linear function.
Proof: Let (PJ,1, D1) and (PJ,2, D2) be such that
Di = max
pJ|X :E[E[ρJ (J)]]≤PJ,i
E[d(S, Sˆ)] (6)
and let p1J|X and p
2
J|X be the corresponding maximizing distributions in (6). Now let us define a new jamming distribution
pβJ|X where, p
β
J|X = βp
1
J|X + (1 − β)p2J|X . Also, let PJ,β = βPJ,1 + (1 − β)PJ,2. Since E[d(S, Sˆ)] is a linear function of
pJ|X , therefore D(PJ,β) = βD(PJ,1) + (1− β)D(PJ,2). Hence, it follows that D(PJ) is linear in PJ .
We now give the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: To prove this result, it is sufficient to establish that the following lemma is true.
Lemma 6. For a given source pS , a channel pY |X,J , an uncoded user strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ), a distortion measure d, a jammer
cost function ρJ|X ; and any jamming strategy λ¯ ∈ Ln(PJ) which results in average (per-letter) distortion D, D ≤ D(PJ).
Proof: For the average per-letter distortion D, we have
D
(a)
=
1
n
E[d(Sn, Sˆn)] (7a)
(b)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[d(Si, Sˆi)] (7b)
(c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
D
(
E[E[ρJ|X(Ji|Xi)]]
)
(7c)
(d)
= D
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[E[ρJ|X(Ji|Xi)]]
)
(7d)
(e)
≤ D(PJ) (7e)
Here, (a) and (b) follow from (2) and (1) respectively. For (c), we use the definition of D(P ) in (5). Finally, while (d)
follows from the linearity of D(P ) and the linearity of expectation, (e) is true owing to the non-decreasing nature of D(PJ).
This shows that i.i.d jamming maximizes average distortion and hence, concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
We will now show in the following lemma, that under the setup of Theorem 3, if d and ρJ|X are of the form (4b) and (4c)
respectively, then the i.i.d. jamming strategy pJ|X maximizes the average distortion.
Lemma 7. For a given source pS , a channel pY |X,J , an uncoded user strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ), if d and ρJ|X are as in (4b)
and (4c); then the i.i.d. jammer strategy pJ|X achieves D(PJ), where PJ = E[ρJ|X(J |X)] with the expectation taken over
pSpX|SpJ|X .
Proof: Let p˜J|X be another feasible i.i.d. jamming strategy. Let ∆pJ|X and ∆p˜J|X denote the average distortion resulting
from the jammer strategies pJ|X and p˜J|X respectively. Then, we have
∆pJ|X −∆p˜J|X
=
∑
x,j
∑
s,y,sˆ
pS(s)pX|S(x|s)pY |X,J(y|x, j)
pSˆ|Y (sˆ|y)d(s, sˆ)
 (pJ|X(j|x)− p˜J|X(j|x))
Now, let us define h(x, j) = (ρJ|X(j|x)− c2)/c1. It is clear from the expression of ρJ|X in (4c) that
∆pJ|X −∆p˜J|X ≥
∑
x,j
h(x, j)(pJ|X(x|j)− p˜J|X(x|j))
=
1
c1
∑
x,j
ρJ|X(j|x)(pJ|X(x|j)− p˜J|X(x|j))
The first term is PJ by definition, and the second term is the expected cost incurred by the i.i.d. jamming strategy p˜J|X . Since
p˜J|X is also a feasible i.i.d. jamming strategy with expected cost at most PJ , we have
∆pJ|X −∆p˜J|X ≥ 0.
For a given user strategy, as assumed in Lemma 7, there may be multiple feasible i.i.d. jamming strategies which are optimal.
In fact, it can be noted from the above proof that if the definition of ρJ|X in (4c) holds with equality for all (x, j) with
pJ|X(j|x) = 0, then any i.i.d. jamming strategy p˜J|X which utilizes the full cost PJ is optimal. However, for such p˜J|X , the
user strategy (pX|S , pSˆ|Y ) may not be optimal, and thus, this pair of strategies may not form a Nash equilibrium.
IV. SOME IMPORTANT ILLUSTRATIONS OF THEOREM 2
We now provide some example JSCCSJ setups that are matched source-jammer-channel systems. We first consider a Gaussian
JSCCSJ where a Gaussian source is communicated over an AWGN channel under the squared error distortion measure, and
quadratic cost function for the encoder and the jammer. Next, we consider a Binary JSCCSJ where a binary symmetric source
is sent over a binary symmetric channel under the Hamming distortion measure and constant cost function for the encoder and
fixed cost function for the jammer.
A. The Gaussian JSCCSJ
In the Gaussian JSCCSJ, the source is i.i.d. Gaussian with pS ∼ N (0, 1) (can be easily generalized to arbitrary variance). The
channel is an AWGN channel with pY |X,J ∼ N (X + J, σ2). In addition, the source distortion measure d(s, sˆ) = (s− sˆ2), the
encoder cost function ρX(x) = x2, and the jammer cost function ρJ|X(j|x) = j2. Let us consider an uncoded communication
strategy with deterministic encoder f(S) =
√
PUS and decoder g(Y ) = PU/(PU + σ2)Y . They correspond to pX|S(x|s) =
I{x=√PUs} and pSˆ|y(sˆ|y) = I{sˆ=yPU/(PU+σ2)}, where I denotes the indicator function. Let us also consider the i.i.d. jamming
strategy Ji = αXi + Ri, α is a constant and Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , n are i.i.d. with each Ri ∼ N (0, σ2R). So, conditioned on X ,
the jammer signal J has the distribution N (αX, σ2R). Here α and σ2R depend on σ2, PU and PJ as given in [3, Theorem 1].
It can be checked that for these user and jammer strategies, d, ρX , and ρJ|X satisfy (4). Hence we have
Lemma 8. The Gaussian JSCCSJ is a matched system, and the uncoded communication with encoder f(S) =
√
PUS and
decoder g(Y ) = PU/(PU + σ2)Y and i.i.d. linear Gaussian jamming form a Nash equilibrium.
Note that [3, Theorem 1] is a special case of the Gaussian JSCCSJ considered in Lemma 8 for n = 1.
B. The Binary JSCCSJ
In the binary JSCCSJ, an i.i.d binary symmetric source with pS ∼ Bern(1/2), is to be transmitted over a binary symmetric
channel Y = X ⊕ J ⊕ Z, where Z ∼ Bern(p) is an independent noise with p ≤ 1/2 (without loss of generality; otherwise
things change slightly as pointed out later), J ∈ {0, 1}, and ⊕ denotes modulo-2 addition. In addition, the source has Hamming
distortion measure d(s, sˆ) = dH(s, sˆ) = Is6=sˆ, the encoder has constant cost function ρX(x) = k, and the binary jammer has
cost function ρJ|X(j|x) = j. Let the jammer have a cost constraint PJ ≤ 1/2. This restricts the jammer to input at most PJ
fraction of 1s. Note that p ∗ PJ := p(1− PJ) + PJ(1− p) ≤ 1/2 so that the jammer and the independent noise together can
not flip more than half of the transmitted bits. Let us consider an uncoded communication strategy with deterministic encoder
f(S) = S and decoder g(Y ) = Y . They correspond to pX|S(x|s) = I{x=s} and pSˆ|y(sˆ|Y ) = I{sˆ=y}. Let us also consider the
i.i.d. jamming strategy (independent of encoder output on the channel) with Ji ∼ Bern(PJ).
It can be checked that for these user and jammer strategies, d, ρX , and ρJ|X satisfy (4). Hence we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. The Binary JSCCSJ is a matched system, and the uncoded communication with encoder f(S) = S and decoder
g(Y ) = Y and i.i.d. Bernoulli jamming independent of state form a Nash equilibrium.
Since the binary JSCCSJ satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2 for uncoded user communication and i.i.d. jamming indepen-
dent of X as mentioned above, it proves the lemma. This shows that the binary JSCCSJ is implicitly connected to the above
user and jammer strategies.
In the following, we present a more specific elementary proof of Lemma 9. We proceed by validating (3) for this pair of
strategies. We first establish the RHS and then, proceed to establish the LHS of (3).
Proof of Lemma 9:
The RHS of inequality (3): To prove the RHS of (3), let us fix the jammer strategy to be i.i.d. Bern(PJ), We now have an
equivalent BSC with a transition probability pˆ = p(1− PJ) + (1− p)PJ . Thus, we now have the problem of communicating
a binary symmetric source S over a BSC(pˆ) with pˆ ≤ 1/2. From [2], [7], we know that if ρX(x) is a constant function,
and the source distortion measure is the Hamming distortion measure, the single-letter coding scheme, where f(S) = S and
g(Y ) = Y , is an optimal communication scheme which minimizes the average distortion. This validates the RHS of (3) for
the binary JSCCSJ.
The LHS of inequality (3): Here, we assume that the user strategy is the single-letter coding strategy where f(S) = S and
g(Y ) = Y . From Theorem 3, we know that for this user strategy of uncoded communication, the best jamming strategy is an
i.i.d. jamming strategy. The best jamming strategy is the solution of the optimization problem in (5) under the cost constraint PJ .
We now show that for the given jammer cost function, the best jamming strategy is a Bern(PJ ) jamming strategy independent
of X . Since ρJ|X(j|x) = j, the best jamming strategy is the solution of the following problem.
arg max
pJ|X :E[J]≤PJ
E[dH(S, Sˆ)]
= arg max
pJ|X :E[J]≤PJ
E[dH(S, S ⊕ J ⊕ Z)]
= arg max
pJ :E[J]≤PJ
E[J ⊕ Z]
= arg max
pJ :E[J]≤PJ
Pr{J ⊕ Z = 1}
This follows by noting that Sˆ = S⊕J ⊕Z for the given encoder-decoder pair, where Z ∼ Bern(p). This shows that J can be
chosen independent of X . Clearly, under the given jammer cost constraint, the above maximum is achieved by J ∼ Bern(PJ).
This completes the proof.
V. DISCUSSION
We see that the matching in a JSCCSJ depends on the following: the source (with distortion measure), the channel (with
user and jammer cost functions), the single-letter user coding scheme along with the i.i.d. jammer strategy. In [2], the results
in Lemmas 3 and 4 of that paper (not reproduced here) were instrumental in determining the conditions on the encoder cost
function and distortion measure for matching in JSCC systems with no jammer. These “inverse” lemmas show that there is
a choice of the cost function and cost constraint (distortion measure and distortion constraint, resp.) under which a given
input distribution (test channel distribution, resp.) is optimal for the channel (source, resp.) coding problem. In establishing the
conditions for matching in JSCCSJ in our work, we see that, along with [2, Lemmas 3 and 4], our Lemma 7 also plays an
important role. Lemma 7 is also an “inverse” lemma in that it establishes that there is a choice for the jammer cost function
(ρJ|X ) and cost constraint (PJ ) such that a given i.i.d. jamming strategy is optimal against a (given) uncoded user strategy.
In our example, the equilibrium strategies for the user and the jammer are linear strategies. However, this does not rule out
the existence of other pairs of equilibrium strategies, possibly non-linear. This, and other related questions, are investigated
in [5], [6].
Finally, the binary JSCCSJ extends straight forwardly to the L−ary uniform system to give more examples of discrete
alphabet matched JSCCSJs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the effects of correlated jamming on the performance of a JSCC system. The user-jammer interaction
was modeled as a zero sum game over the average distortion and the optimal performance of the system was characterized
through the Nash equilibrium utility of the game. A set of conditions on the source and the channel were determined for
the existence of an equilibrium, where the equilibrium user strategy was uncoded communication and the equilibrium jammer
strategy was i.i.d jamming. Thus, a probabilistic matching of the source, jammer and channel was shown to exist and such
systems were called matched source-jammer-channel systems. It was shown that a well-known example of a Gaussian JSCC
with jamming was a special case of our problem. In addition, another example of Binary JSCC system with a jammer, was
analysed and its solution provided.
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